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Forthcoming, Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts  
 
Private International Law Aspects of Authors' Contracts: the Dutch and French 
Examples 
 





Copyright generally vests in the author, the human creator of the 
work.  But because, at least until recently, most authors have been 
ill-equipped to commercialize and disseminate their works on their 
own, the author has granted rights to intermediaries to market her 
works.  Since most authors are the weaker parties to publishing, 
production, or distribution contracts, the resulting deal may favor 
the interests of the intermediary to the detriment of the author’s 
interests.  Many national copyright laws have introduced a variety 
of corrective measures, from the very first copyright act, the 1710 
British Statute of Anne, which instituted the author’s reversion 
right  (still in force, albeit much modified, in U.S. copyright law), 
to detailed limitations on the form and scope of grants found in 
many continental European copyright laws.  Recently, the 
Netherlands and France have amended their copyright laws to 
reinforce author-protective provisions; the French reforms 
particularly envision the publishing contract in the digital 
environment.   
 
But many author contracts, especially in the digital environment, 
grant rights for multiple territories:  how does the international 
dimension of these agreements affect the practical ability of 
individual countries to regulate authors’ contracts with respect to 
exploitations occurring within their borders?  If, on the one hand, 
“lawmakers tend to be provincial in developing copyright-contract 
rules, remaining focused on largely local parties and interests 
rather than on policies common to many jurisdictions,” and, on the 
other, general principles of private international law leave to the 
parties the determination of the law applicable to their contract, 
may the parties simply avoid “provincial” protections of authors’ 
                                                          
*Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University School of Law. 
Research for this article was made possible through The Philippe P. Dauman Faculty Research Fund, 
established in 2007 by Philippe P. Dauman, Columbia Law School '78 and The Philippe and Deborah 
Dauman Family Foundation.   
**Professor of Law, Université de Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne).  The authors are most grateful to Prof. 
Marie-Elodie Ancel and Prof. Edouard Treppoz.  Thanks as well to Prof. Dirk Visser, Prof. Mireille van 
Eechoud and Dr. Silke von Lewinski, and to Prof. George Bermann and other participants in the Columbia 
Law School faculty workshop. 
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economic interests by choosing (or the stronger party imposing) 
the law of a less author-interventionist jurisdiction to govern the 
full territorial extent of the transfer? 
 
This Article will first discuss two examples of reforms of copyright-
contract law, then will consider the extent to which private 
international law rules may render these reforms largely 
ineffective for authors who grant rights for multiple territories.  
Finally, we will propose private international law approaches that 
preserve local author-protective contract restrictions without 
rendering the implementation of the international agreement 
unduly cumbersome or unpredictable.  We recognize that our 
approach departs from classic, content-neutral, private 
international law rules, because it seeks to impose a particular 
outcome.  But content-neutral choice of law rules are what create 
the problem that provoked this examination in the first place:  the 
rule of “party autonomy,” that directs courts to look to the law the 
parties choose for their contract enables the stronger party to 
avoid weaker party protections simply by submitting the contract 
to a less-constraining national law.  The proposed rule remains 
within the general private international law (non substantive) 
framework because it in no way instructs States to adopt author-
protective measures.  It simply endeavors to ensure, if a State does 
determine to recalibrate the balance of power between authors and 
exploiters, that the contract not set the State’s efforts to protect its 




Copyright generally vests in the author, the human creator of the work.
1
  But 
because, at least until recently, most authors have been ill equipped to commercialize and 
disseminate their works on their own, the author has granted rights to intermediaries to 
market her works.  Since most authors are the weaker parties to publishing, production, 
or distribution contracts, the resulting deal may favor the interests of the intermediary to 
the detriment of the author’s.  Many national copyright laws have introduced a variety of 
corrective measures, from the very first copyright act, the 1710 British Statute of Anne, 
which instituted the author’s reversion right
2
 (still in force, albeit much modified, in U.S. 
copyright law
3
), to detailed limitations on the form and scope of grants found in many 
continental European copyright laws.
4
  Recently, The Netherlands and France have 
                                                          
1
Some countries, however, including the United States and the Netherlands, vest copyright in works made 
by employees in the course of their employment in the employer, who may often be a juridical person. 
2
Act for the Encouragement of Learning (Statute of Anne), 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 11 (Gr. Brit.) (“[T]he sole 
right shall return to the author” if still living at the expiration of the initial 14-year copyright term). 
3
17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012) (creating the inalienable right to terminate grants 35 years after the execution of 
the contract). 
4
See, e.g., Loi 92-597 du 1 juillet 1992 [Code of Intellectual Property], Journal Officiel de la République 
Française [J.O.], July 3, 1992, arts. L. 131-1-132-30 [hereinafter French Code of Intellectual Property], 
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amended their copyright laws to reinforce author-protective provisions; the French 
reforms particularly envision the publishing contract in the digital environment.   
 
But many author contracts, especially in the digital environment, grant rights for 
multiple territories:  how does the international dimension of these agreements affect the 
practical ability of individual countries to regulate authors’ contracts with respect to 
exploitations occurring within their borders?  If, on the one hand, “lawmakers tend to be 
provincial in developing copyright-contract rules, remaining focused on largely local 
parties and interests rather than on policies common to many jurisdictions,”
5
 and, on the 
other, general principles of private international law leave to the parties the determination 
of the law applicable to their contract, may the parties simply avoid “provincial” 
protections of authors’ economic interests by choosing (or the stronger party imposing) 
the law of a less author-interventionist jurisdiction to govern the full territorial extent of 
the transfer? 
 
This Article will in Part I discuss two examples of reforms of copyright-contract 
law; Part II will then consider (A) the extent to which private international law rules may 
render these reforms largely ineffective for authors who grant rights for multiple 
territories, and (B) will propose private international law approaches that preserve local 
author-protective contract restrictions without rendering the implementation of the 
international agreement unduly cumbersome or unpredictable.  
 
I.   Substantive Provisions of the Dutch and French Laws on Authors’ Contracts 
 




 Under Dutch law, employers are the copyright owners of employee-created 
works.
7
  But the Dutch version of works made for hire does not extend to works by 
freelance creators.  As to nonemployee authors, the new copyright law announces a 
principle of strict interpretation of the scope of contracts:  the grant “shall comprise only 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=2D013356C523C269C96912FA8B0AE456.tpdjo0
4v_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000029759371&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006069414&dateTexte=201502
08; Germany, Gesetz über Urheberrect und verwandte Schutzrechte (Urheberrechtsgesetz) [Copyright Act], 
Sept. 9, 1965 (Ger.), §§ 31-32(B), 36; Belgium, Loi Relative au Droit D’Auteur et aux Droits Voisins [Law 
on Copyright and Neighboring Rights] of June 30, 1994 (as amended by the Law of Apr. 3, 1995), arts. 3, 
11, 24, 26, 55.  For analysis of particular national laws’ provisions on authors’ contracts, see, e.g., 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (Lionel Bently ed., LexisNexis 2015).  On amendments 
to the German author-protective provisions, see, e.g., Wilhelm Nordemann, A Revolution of Copyright in 
Germany, 49 J.Copyright Soc’y 1041 (2002); William R. Cornish, The Author as Risk-Sharer, 26 COLUM. 
J. LAW & THE ARTS 1, 8–16 (2002).  See generally, Paul Katzenberger, Protection of the Author as the 
Weaker Party to a Contract under International Copyright Contract Law, 19 I.I.C. 731 (1988). 
5
Paul Edward Geller, International Copyright: The Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND 
PRACTICE supra note 4, at INT-259. 
6
Copyright Contract Act of June 30, 2015, Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Stb. 2015, 257, 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2015-257.html, http://www.ipmc.nl/en/topics/new-copyright-
contract-law-netherlands (Visser Schapp & Kreijger trans) (amending the Dutch Copyright Act of 1912) 
[hereinafter Dutch Copyright Contract Act].  Thanks to the law firm of Visser Schaap & Kreijger for the 
English translation of the Act.  
7
Dutch Copyright Act of 1912, art. 7 [hereinafter Dutch Copyright Act]. 
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the rights that are stated in the deed or that necessarily derive from the nature and purpose 
of the title or the grant of the license.”
8
  This provision confirms prior case law narrowly 
interpreting the scope of grants in the context of modes of exploitation developed after 
the conclusion of the contract.
9
  By contrast, in some countries, in the absence of a 





 The Dutch law contains several nonwaivable provisions assuring authors “fair 
compensation.”
11
  As a general rule, contracts are to stipulate fair compensation for 
grants of rights of exploitation, and the Minister of Education, Culture and Science is to 
“determine the amount of fair compensation for a specific sector and for a certain period 
of time” upon the “joint request of an association of makers existing in the relevant sector 
and a commercial user or an association of commercial users.  This request shall contain 
jointly agreed advice regarding fair compensation and a clear definition of the sector to 
which the request relates.”
12
  The law’s “bestseller clause” provides for additional 
compensation when “the agreed compensation is seriously disproportionate to the 
proceeds from the exploitation of the work,” although the law does not define “seriously 
disproportionate.”
13
  (The German copyright law has long had such a clause,
14
 so case 
law under that provision may provide some guidance.)  The law provides a further source 
of remuneration when the contract explicitly covers uses unknown at the time of 
contracting:  the original grantee or its successor(s) must provide additional 




 The law reverts rights to the author upon notifying the grantee “if the other party 
to the contract does not sufficiently exploit the copyright to the work within a reasonable 
period after having concluded the contract, or does not sufficiently exploit the copyright 
after having initially performed acts of exploitation.”
16
  While the reversion right may not 
be waived, the law does not define these terms.  Perhaps the dispute resolution 





                                                          
8
Dutch Copyright Contract Act art. 1A (modifying art. 2 of the Dutch Copyright Act). 
9
See, e.g., Dist. Ct. Amsterdam 24 Sept. 1997, AMI 1997, 9, p. 194, NJV (Freelancers/Volkskrant 
newspaper) (Neth.) (holding that a 1980s publishing contract did not cover digital exploitations). 
10
For example, in the United States the rule of interpretation is considered a matter of state contract law, 
which may lead to different outcomes.  Compare Cohen v. Paramount Pictures, 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 
1988) with Boosey & Hawkes v. Disney, 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998) (both interpreting the scope of 
synchronization licenses and reaching different conclusions as to the extension of the licenses to cover 
distribution of videocassettes to the public).   
11
Dutch Copyright Act art. 25h(1) (non waivability).  Art. 45d(2), however, excludes video on demand 
from the principal director’s and screenwriter’s statutory rights to fair compensation.  The rationale for this 
exclusion is unclear.  
12
Id. art. 25c. 
13
Id. art. 25d. 
14
German Copyright Act of 9 Sept. 1965 (Federal Law Gazette Part I, p. 1273), as last amended by Article 
8 of the Act of 1 Oct. 2013 (Federal Law Gazette Part I, p. 3714), art. 32a. 
15
Dutch Copyright Contract Act art. 25c(6). 
16
Id. art 25e. 
17
Id. art 25g. 
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B.  French Law Limitations on the Scope of Authors’ Contracts 
 
The French Code of Intellectual Property safeguards authors against leonine 
transfers in a variety of ways.  In addition to mandating that publishing contracts, 
performance rights contracts, and audiovisual production contracts be in writing,
18
 the 
law further requires that each right granted be distinctly specified in the contract, and that 
the scope of the grant be defined with respect to its purpose, its geographic extent, and its 
duration.
19
  As a general rule, authors are to receive royalties, rather than a lump sum 
payment; the law lists limited instances in which a flat fee is permitted.
20
  Amendments to 
the statutory provisions on publishing contracts, introduced at the end of 2014, further 
detail authors’ rights in print and digital editions of literary works.
21
  These modifications 
seek to ensure that publishers will in fact exercise the rights that authors grant them, and 
will fairly account to authors for the fruits of those exploitations.  Failure to publish the 
work within a certain time, or to pursue the exploitation of the rights in a consistent 
manner (“exploitation permanente et suivie”), or to reissue a book that has gone out of 
print, will result in reversion of print or electronic rights to the author.   
 
The new provisions require the grant to distinguish print from digital editions (any 
contract that grants digital rights but fails to include a distinct section regarding their 
exploitation will be void), and impose additional author protections with respect to the 
latter.
22
  Notably, the contract must guarantee authors “just and fair remuneration” for all 
the revenues deriving from the commercialization and dissemination of digital editions.
23
  
The law acknowledges the possibility of flat fee payments, but significantly constrains 
the circumstances under which publishers may avail themselves of that form of 
remuneration:  the law expressly prohibits grants of all digital rights and over all forms of 
exploitation.  Rather, flat fee payments “are allowed only for a specific operation, and 
every new operation for which a flat fee is permitted requires a renegotiation of the 
fee.”
24
  In addition, contracts granting electronic rights must include a clause providing 
for periodic review of the economic conditions of the grant;
25
 an accord between 
associations of authors and of publishers will determine the frequency of the reviews and 
                                                          
18
French Code of Intellectual Property art. L131-2.  U.S. Copyright law requires that the grant of any 
exclusive right must be in writing and signed by the grantor.  17 U.S.C. § 204(a). 
19
French Code of Intellectual Property art. L131-3.  The author may grant rights for future modes of 
exploitation unknown at the time of the contract, but such a grant must be explicit, and must provide for a 
share in the profits of the new form of exploitation.  Id. art. L131-6. 
20
Id. art. L131-4; L132-6. 
21
Id. art. L132-17-1 et seq. 
22
Id. art. L132-17-1: « Lorsque le contrat d'édition a pour objet l'édition d'un livre à la fois sous une forme 
imprimée et sous une forme numérique, les conditions relatives à la cession des droits d'exploitation sous 
une forme numérique sont déterminées dans une partie distincte du contrat, à peine de nullité de la cession 
de ces droits. » 
23
Id. art. L132-17-6. 
24
Id.  « Dans les cas prévus de recours à un forfait, ce dernier ne saurait être versé à l'auteur en contrepartie 
de la cession de l'ensemble de ses droits d'exploitation sous une forme numérique et pour tous les modes 
d'exploitation numérique du livre. Dans les cas de contributions à caractère accessoire ou non essentiel 
mentionnés au 4° de l'article L. 131-4, une telle cession est possible.  
Le forfait ne peut être justifié que pour une opération déterminée et toute nouvelle opération 
permettant le recours à un forfait s'accompagne de sa renégociation. » 
25
Id. art. L132-17-7. 
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will provide guidelines for dispute resolution.
26
  The law also promotes the development 
of digital editions: a grantee that fails to disseminate a digital edition within the time set 
out in an accord between associations of authors and of publishers will lose those rights 
back to the author.
27
  Moreover, and rather unusually, the law applies even to contracts 
concluded before the law’s effective date:  for two years after the law’s entry into force, 
the law empowers authors to demand that the publisher produce a digital edition; the 
publisher’s failure to do within three months following proper notification results in 




II.  Private International Law Consequences of the Dutch and French laws on 
Authors’ Contracts 
 
A.  Application of Statutory and General PIL Rules 
 
Before we examine the specific cases of the Dutch and French laws, we recall 
some general rules of private international law and copyright contracts.  The 
determination of applicable law first turns on the characterization of the issue.  Matters of 
substantive copyright law, including the rights conveyed by the contract, are governed by 
the lex protectionis, or law of the country for which protection is sought, i.e., where the 
work is exploited.
29
  Matters of contract are submitted to the law chosen by the parties to 
the contract (if the contract includes a choice of law provision) or to the law of the 
country in which the contractual relationship is localized.  In the EU, the Rome I 
Regulation, establishes criteria for identifying the law governing the contract (lex 
contractus).
30
   
 
In the case of copyright contracts, defining which matters come within the domain 
of a national copyright law and which fall within the domain of the law of the contract is 
an exercise fraught with controversy.  The respective rights of the parties to the contract 
may resolve differently depending on which law applies.  In particular, if national law 
prohibits the transfer of certain rights—such as moral rights or rights to modes of 
exploitation unknown at the time of the contract’s conclusion—may an author 
nonetheless grant the right in full for all territories if she and her co-contractant choose 
the law of a country that permits such transfers?
31
  Or, suppose the national copyright law 
conditions the validity of a transfer of rights on compliance with obligations respecting 
the mode of payment or of execution of the contract.  For example, the new French law 
                                                          
26
Id. art. L132-17-8(8). 
27
Id. art. L132-17-5 . 
28
Ordonnance n° 2014-1348 of 2 Novembre 2014, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE  LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 
[J.O.], Nov. 13, 2014, p. 19101, art. 9.  Arts. 11 and 12 provide for application of other author protections 
to contracts concluded before the law’s effective date. 
29
ALI Principles of Intellectual Property § 301 (2008); European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in 
Intellectual Property, Principles on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property art. 3:102 (2011) [hereinafter 
CLIP].  
30
REGULATION (EC) No 593/2008 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 
17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations [hereinafter Rome I]. 
31
See, e.g., Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights of June 30, 1994, art. 3(1)(6) (Belg.) (only the clause 




on publishing contracts provides for a reversion of rights if the grantee fails to exercise 
them within a given period.
32
  Moreover, as seen in both the Dutch and the French laws, 
national copyright laws may permit the grant of rights in new modes of exploitation, but 
require additional payment in return.
33
  Or suppose the national law conditions the 
validity of the transfer on compliance with certain formal prerequisites, such as the 
contract being in writing and signed by the author, or that the contract distinctly identify 
each mode of exploitation for which it transfers rights.
34
  Or suppose the national 
copyright law sets out a rule of interpretation calling for strict construction of copyright 




 Outcomes may be more predictable if it is clear from the outset whether the issue 
is characterized as one of substantive copyright law, or instead as one of contract law.  
But, in addition to the difficulties of distinguishing the respective domains, general rules 
of private international law inject a further complication:  characterization typically 
comes within the judicial competence of the forum,
36
 and different national courts may 
adopt different characterizations of the same issue (with consequently different results).  
One can anticipate that, as the stronger party, the exploiter might avoid the application of 
author-protective copyright laws by imposing a choice of forum clause that will ensure 
the competence of a court likely to characterize the dispute as one of contract rather than 
of substantive copyright law.  By the same token, the choice of forum clause might select 
a country unlikely to find that the law of the contract (assuming the national law of the 
forum is different) violates its fundamental public policies. 
 
National copyright laws, however, might remove this layer of analysis by 
anticipating the international dimension of copyright transfers and articulating when the 
national law will nonetheless apply, in effect designating the national author-protective 
rules as of overriding mandatory application.  This technique will instruct local courts as 
to which law governs.  If the question of the scope of the contract comes before another 
jurisdiction, those courts’ application of the foreign rule will depend on whether the 
                                                          
32
French Code of Intellectual Property art. L132-17-2 (III) (“III.-La cession des droits d'exploitation sous 
une forme numérique est résiliée de plein droit lorsque, après une mise en demeure de l'auteur adressée par 
lettre recommandée avec demande d'avis de réception, l'éditeur ne satisfait pas dans un délai de six mois à 
compter de cette réception, aux obligations qui lui incombent à ce titre.”); art. L132-17-5 (“Lorsque 
l'éditeur n'a pas procédé à cette réalisation, la cession des droits d'exploitation sous une forme numérique 
est résiliée de plein droit.”). 
33
Dutch Copyright Act art. 25c(6); French Code of Intellectual Property art. L131-6 (“La clause d'une 
cession qui tend à conférer le droit d'exploiter l'oeuvre sous une forme non prévisible ou non prévue à la 
date du contrat doit être expresse et stipuler une participation corrélative aux profits d'exploitation”) 
34
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C § 204(a) (transfer of exclusive rights, to be valid requires a writing signed by author or 
copyright owner); French Code of Intellectual Property arts. L. 131-3(1). 
35
Dutch Copyright Act art. 2(3): (“Whole or partial assignment, as well as the grant of an exclusive licence, 
may only be effected by means of a deed executed for that purpose. The assignment or the grant of an 
exclusive licence shall comprise only the rights that are stated in the deed or that necessarily derive from 
the nature and purpose of the title or the grant of the licence.”) 
36
See, e.g., ALI Principles of Intellectual Property, Introduction (2008) (“The Principles . . . leave to the 
forum general issues of private international and procedural law, such as those concerning standing, 
characterization . . . .”).  In the E.U., the Court of Justice has ruled that the characterization of a dispute as 
in contract or in tort is a matter of E.U. law.  See Case C-548/12, Brogsitter v. Fabrication de Montres 
Normandes, 2014 E.C.R. 148. 
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relevant jurisdiction acknowledges another state’s mandatory rules.
37
  The new Dutch 
copyright law and the 2002 German copyright amendments that inspired it offer 
examples of this approach.  As we will see, the answers to the questions whether local 
authors (or indeed foreign authors as well) will obtain the protections of local law when 
their works are exploited within a given territory may differ based on those countries’ 
(and foreign fora’s) approaches to identifying the applicable law. 
 
1.  Territorial Application of the Dutch Law on Authors’ Contracts 
 
The Dutch law specifies the circumstances under which its author-protective 
provisions will apply, in the event that the contract contains a choice of law clause 
designating the governance of the contract by a law other than that of the Netherlands, or 
in the event that the contract does not contain a choice of law clause.
38
  The law thus 
follows neither the lex contractus approach that leaves to the parties’ choice the law 
applicable to the modalities of the transfer, nor a full lex protectionis approach through 
which the law of each country for which rights are granted determines both the scope of 
the grant of rights and the conditions on their transfer. 
 
Article 25h  
. . . 
2. Regardless of the law that governs the contract, the provisions of this chapter 
shall apply if: 
a. the contract would have been governed by Dutch law when no applicable 
law had been chosen; or 
b. the acts of exploitation take place or should take place wholly or 




This text prompts many questions.  The opening text of subsection 2 appears to assume 
that the law that governs the contract would otherwise govern the obligations of the 
exploiter and the rights of the author, i.e., that the law of the contract would determine 
questions of substantive copyright scope.  Such an assumption is in some tension with the 
                                                          
37
On giving effect to a third country’s mandatory rules, see, e.g., ALI Principles of Intellectual Property § 
323 (2008); CLIP art. 3:901(1) (2011). 
38
The Dutch law appears to be inspired by art. 32(b) of the German Copyright Act of 9 September 1965 
(Federal Law Gazette Part I, p. 1273), as last amended by Article 8 of the Act of 1 October 2013 (Federal 
Law Gazette Part I, p. 3714), which provides: 
Article 32b 
Compulsory application 
The application of Articles 32 and 32a [on equitable remuneration and redress of “conspicuous 
disproportion” in authors’ remuneration] shall be compulsory 
1.  if German law would be applicable to the exploitation agreement in the absence of a choice of 
law, or 
2.  to the extent that the agreement covers significant acts of exploitation within the territory to 
which this Act applies. 
According to one of the leading commentators on the German copyright law, the purpose of this provision 
“was to protect the remuneration rights in section 32a against circumvention by resort to foreign laws.”  
Paul Katzenberger, sec. 32b, No. 3, in URHEBERRECHT KOMMENTAR (Gerhardt Schricker & Ulrich 
Loewenheim, eds., 4th ed. 2010). 
39
Dutch Copyright Law art. 25h. 
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general proposition that the law chosen by the parties to the contract governs matters of 
contract, not of substantive copyright law; at least, by conflating the domain of the law of 
the contract and the domain of the law of the substantive right, the preamble to subsection 
2 demonstrates the uncertainty surrounding the delimitation of the respective domains.   
 
The text goes on to provide that the Dutch rules for authors’ copyright contracts 
will apply if “the contract would have been governed by Dutch law when no applicable 
law had been chosen,” i.e., if the contract were localized in the Netherlands.
40
  The text 
implicitly refers to article 4 of the European Union’s Rome I Regulation on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations.
41
  Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation provides in 
relevant part: 
 
Article 4:  Applicable law in the absence of choice 
 
1.  To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in 
accordance with Article 3 . . ., the law governing the contract shall be determined 
as follows: 
(a)  a contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by the law of the 
country where the seller has his habitual residence;  
(b)  a contract for the provision of services shall be governed by the 
law of the country where the service provider has his habitual residence; 
2.  Where the contract is not covered by paragraph 1 or where the elements of the 
contract would be covered by more than one of points (a) to (h) of paragraph 1, 
the contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the party required 
to effect the characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual residence. 
3.  Where the law applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 2, 





As a first step, it is necessary to ascertain what kind of contract a grant of 
copyright is.  Is it a contract for sale of goods?  If so, the Rome I Regulation localizes the 
contract at the author’s residence.  But, transfer of exploitation rights from the author to 
an exploiter might be considered a “contract for the provision of services,” since the 
exploiter is supposed to publish, broadcast, etc. the work.  In that event, the contract is 
localized at the residence of the exploiter, leading to the opposite result from the law that 
would be applicable were the contract considered one for the sale of goods.  If neither of 
these characterizations applies, art. 4 of the Rome I Regulation provides a residual point 
of attachment:  the law of the member State of the party owing the characteristic 
performance.
43
  But who is that, as between the author or the exploiter?  One might say 
“the exploiter” (for example, the publisher), but were that so, the contract would not be 
subject to Dutch law if the publisher is not habitually resident in the Netherlands, even if 




Rome I.  
42
Id. art. 4.  
43
Id.  Subsection (4) offers another residual point of attachment, but if the contract is between residents of 




the author is.  (For reasons explored below, art. 25h(2)(b) does not necessarily save the 
situation for “Dutch” authors, i.e. authors who are habitually resident in the Netherlands.)  
By contrast, if the publisher resides in the Netherlands, then the Dutch law conditions on 
the author’s grant of rights would appear to apply even if the author does not reside in the 
Netherlands and even with respect to exploitations taking place outside the Netherlands.  
The last observation stems from the structure of art. 25h, which prefaces (2)(b) with “or,” 
which would means that it is not necessary that the exploitation take place wholly or 
predominantly in the Netherlands so long as the contract is localized in the Netherlands.  
Subsection (2)(b) applies if the contract is not localized in the Netherlands. 
 
If, on the other hand, the debtor of the characteristic performance is the author, 
then authors having their habitual residence in the Netherlands will get the benefit of the 
law’s unwaivable (art. 25h(1)) protections.  It appears that those protections apply to 
multiterritorial grants as well, so that the author could, for example, claim from the co-
contractant publisher the benefits of the best seller clause if the book is a great and 
unanticipated success in Portugal, or the author could reclaim the rights if the co-
contractant publisher (wherever resident), having received rights for Italy, failed to 
exploit them there.  These outcomes—which seem consistent with the specifications in 
25(d) and 25(c)(6) (unknown uses) that the author’s right may be enforced against the 
original grantee’s successors—would follow from application of the Dutch law rules, 
regardless of whether Portuguese copyright law includes a “best seller clause,” or 
whether Italian law includes a “use-it-or-lose-it” condition on authors’ grants to 
exploiters.  This localization of the contract therefore produces an extraterritorial 




Article 4(3) establishes another residual point of attachment, which, given the 
difficulty of determining which party, author or exploiter, renders the “characteristic 
performance,”
45
 might prove the best adapted: the country with which the contract is 
most closely connected.  When author and exploiter reside in the same country, that 
country would seem to have the closest nexus, particularly if the exploitation 
comprehends the country of common residence.  When one party resides in the same 
country as one of the countries of exploitation, that country would have a good claim to 
close connection.  When the parties’ residence does not converge with a country of 
exploitation, the country where the work is first exploited might qualify as the nexus 
state. 
 
Article 25h(2)(b) sets out an alternative point of attachment that largely avoids 
applying Dutch rules to exploitations occurring outside the Netherlands (but gives rise to 
other problems):  if the contract is not localized in the Netherlands, the new Dutch law 
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The problem of extraterritoriality persists even if both the author and the exploiter are residents of the 
Netherlands (which might make the Netherlands the country with which the contract is most closely 
connected under Rome I art 4(3)), because Dutch law would still apply to exploitations in other countries 
for which the contract grants rights. 
45
Dutch Copyright Law Art. 4(3).  Regarding the difficulty of determining whose performance is 
“characteristic” when an author grants exploitation rights, see, e.g., André Lucas, comment on Cour 
d’Appel Paris, 2 Apr. 2003, Martinelli v. Gallimard, 198 RIDA 413, 9 PROPRIÉTÉS 
INTELLECTUELLES 392 (Oct. 2003). 
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will still apply if “the acts of exploitation take place or should take place wholly or 
predominantly in the Netherlands.”
46
 The law does not, however, define 
“predominantly.”  It is not clear therefore whether the law will apply if somewhat over 
half the exploitation occurs in the Netherlands, or only if considerably more than half (a 
proportion closer to “wholly”), or instead if the country in which the greatest proportion 
of exploitation, even if less than half, occurs.  Whatever the meaning of “predominantly,” 
it follows that if the contract is neither localized in nor wholly or predominantly carried 
out in the Netherlands, the author (whether or not residing in the Netherlands) will not 
enjoy the protections of the Dutch copyright law even with respect to those exploitations 
that do take place in the Netherlands.  For example, if the localization of the contract in 
the Netherlands turns on the publisher’s being resident in the Netherlands, then Dutch 
resident authors will not get the benefit of the Dutch law even as to exploitations in the 
Netherlands if their contracts grant multiterritorial rights to non-Netherlands publishers.  
Yet, if the Dutch resident author is contracting with a non-Netherlands publisher, the 
chances seem strong that the exploitation contracted-for will not be wholly or principally 
limited to exploitations in the Netherlands.
47
   
 
Putting the pieces together, it seems that the law does not fully ensure that Dutch 
resident authors get the benefit of the new law, even with respect to exploitations 
occurring in the Netherlands.
 48
  It is unlikely such an outcome was intended, but even the 
best possible construction (for authors), which would make the author the debtor of the 
characteristic performance, is problematic, since it would give authors residing in the 
Netherlands the benefit of the new law not only for exploitations in the Netherlands but 
also in other countries covered by the contract and thus would have an extraterritorial 
effect not sought by the parties to the contract (since, if the statutory criteria are met, 
Dutch law will apply “Regardless of the law that governs the contract”).   
 
2.  Territorial Application of the French Law on Author’s Contracts 
 
Unlike the new Dutch law, the 2014 French law on authors’ contracts does not 
include a provision on territorial application, but the subsisting general law on copyright, 
which derives from the 1957 copyright law, specially exempts certain international 
contracts from the obligation to pay proportional remuneration.  Code of intellectual 
property, article L 132-6 derogates from the general rule requiring proportional 
remuneration (art. L 131-3-4), by providing that “grants of right by or to a person or 
enterprise established abroad may be the objects of a flat sum remuneration.”
49
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Dutch Copyright Law art. 25h(2)(B).  It seems, however, unlikely that a contract granting exploitation rights solely 
or predominantly for the Netherlands would not also be localized there.  But one might at least hypothesize a 
contract between an author and publisher resident in the same foreign country, and that the parties’ common 
residence might result in localizing the contract in a country other than the one of exploitation. 
47
On the other hand, non-Dutch resident authors would get the benefit of the new Dutch law in the 
(probably unlikely) event that the non-Dutch resident author’s contract with the non-Netherlands publisher 
grants rights only or predominantly for the Netherlands. 
48
By contrast, art. 32b2 of the German copyright law on which the Dutch law is based does not require that 
the exploitation take place “wholly or predominantly” in Germany; any exploitation in Germany will entitle 
the author to the benefits of German law as to those exploitations. 
49
French Code of Intellectual Property art. L132-6: « Peuvent également faire l'objet d'une rémunération 




A few observations about the scope of this exception:  it is not a general 
derogation from the obligations of French copyright-contract law when one of the parties 
does not reside in France; art. L 132-6 addresses only remuneration, and then only if the 
contract specifies flat fee payment.  Its terms do not purport to extend to the legally 
imposed contractual obligations such as those set out in art. L 131-3 requiring specific 
mention of the rights granted, their scope and purpose, and their geographic extent and 
duration.  By the same token, while the 2014 law on authors’ contracts does not repeal 
art. L 132-6, so the 2014 provisions on proportional remuneration will not apply if the 
contract to which one of the parties is a non-French resident provides for flat fee 
payment, neither does article L 132-6 affect the 2014 law’s other provisions, for example, 
those articulating the scope of flat fee payments,
50
 and those regarding the publisher’s 
duties of timely exploitation of the work.  These would continue to apply (at least when 
French law governs the contract) even when one of the parties to the contract does not 
reside in France.  Similarly, if the contract with a non French-resident party provides for 
proportional remuneration, but the basis of that remuneration does not conform to the 
provisions of the 2014 law,
51
 art. L 132-6 does not provide a basis for exempting the 
contract from the obligations of the 2014 law. 
 
Article L 132-6, it should be noted, does not designate the application of another 
law to govern the mode of remuneration when one of the parties to the contract does not 
reside in France.  The law assumes the contract will be governed by French law, and 
simply allows the parties to choose between a regime of proportional remuneration and 
one of flat-payment remuneration.  In either event, French law will determine the 
contours of the regime.  Thus, for example, if the parties choose a flat-payment regime, 
they will remain subject to art. L 131-5, which provides that “in the event of a grant of 
rights of exploitation, when the author has incurred a prejudice of more than 7/12 as a 
result of a harmful act or insufficient anticipation of the economic results of the work, the 
author may demand a revision of the conditions of the price of the contract.  This demand 
may be made only if the [rights in the] work were granted against a flat sum payment.”
52
  
In sum, the international contracts to which art. L 132-6 pertains are international with 
respect to the parties, but French with respect to the governing law.
53
  Accordingly all 
provisions of the French copyright law concerning authors’ contracts remain applicable. 
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While art. L132-6 sets out exceptions to the rule of proportional remuneration, it does not entitle the 
publisher to pay a single lump sum for an undifferentiated grant of all rights.  Other provisions of the law 
prohibit all-rights grants.  See, e.g., art. L131-1 (global grant of rights in future works is void); 131-3 (3) 
(grant of audiovisual rights must be distinct).  The reference in art. L132-5 and 132-6 to “une remuneration 
forfaitaire” does not mean a single payment for all forms of exploitation, any more than does art. L132-5’s 
reference to “une remuneration proportionnelle” mean a single royalty for all forms of exploitation. 
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For example, art. L132-17-3(2) requires that royalties for the sale of ebooks be calculated on the basis of 
the sale price of the book. 
52
French Code of Intellectual Property art. L131-5 : « En cas de cession du droit d'exploitation, lorsque 
l'auteur aura subi un préjudice de plus de sept douzièmes dû à une lésion ou à une prévision insuffisante des 
produits de l'ouvre, il pourra provoquer la révision des conditions de prix du contrat. Cette demande ne 
pourra être formée que dans le cas où l'ouvre aura été cédée moyennant une rémunération forfaitaire.» 
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See, e.g., Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Nov. 3, 2010, 38 PROPRIÉTÉS 
INTELLECTUELLES 192 (2011) obs. A. Lucas (authorization in art. L132-6 to remunerate by flat fee instead 




French courts have interpreted art. L 132-6 to mean that the obligation to pay 
royalties does not implicate a French public policy so important that the obligation must 
be imposed on contracts not otherwise governed by French law.  In 1989, the Paris Court 
of Appeals in Anne Bragance v. Michel de Grèce, a controversy arising out of a New 
York law contract between a French ghost writer and a New York resident nominal 
author regarding the publication of a French-language book in France, held that, whatever 
the law otherwise applicable to the contract, French law prohibited assignment of the 
ghostwriter’s moral right of “paternity” to be recognized as the author of the book.
54
  By 
contrast, the court further held that, in light of then-article 36(2), as enumerated in the 
1957 French Copyright Law, French law did not bar flat fee remuneration when one of 
the parties did not reside in France.
55
  Since the option to forego royalties was already 
available under French law if one of the co-contractants resides abroad, it could not be 
said that the obligation to pay royalties expressed a French public policy of such 
importance that it must be imposed on contracts governed by other national laws when 




The different outcomes of the moral and economic rights claims in Anne 
Bragance v. Michel de Grèce suggest a greater intensity of public policy with respect to 
rights under copyright that French law declares inalienable.  The waivability of certain 
economic rights in certain circumstances denotes as to those rights a relatively weak 
domestic policy that does not warrant imposition on foreign law contracts.  By contrast, 
the strength of the domestic inalienability rule regarding moral rights indicates that the 
parties to a contract may not elude that prohibition by subjecting their contract to another 
law, at least not with respect to exploitations taking place in France.   
 
The highest civil law court, the Cour de cassation, shortly thereafter confirmed 
this result in Huston v. Turner Entertainment, involving the broadcast in France of a 
colorized black and white motion picture, against the wishes of the U.S. director and 
screenwriter.
57
  Under the law of their contract, however, they had no rights under U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
other obligations imposed by art. L132-6, such as the requirement that, in the case of translations, the 
agreement on flat fee remuneration must be express and in writing). 
54




See also Cour d’appel Paris, 4e ch., Apr. 2, 2003, RIDA 2003, 413, 9 PROPRIETES INTELLECTUELLES 392 
(Oct. 2003), obs. A. Lucas.  The court rejected a claim brought by two Italian-resident photographers for 
additional remuneration for distribution of French translation of illustrated guidebooks when photographers 
entered into a flat fee all-rights publishing contract with a Hong King publisher.  The court held the 
contract was governed by English law, and that the scope of the grant was valid under that law.  The court 
did not address whether application of English law would violate French public policy.  By contrast, and 
without discussing the basis for its choice of law, the court applied French law to the photographers’ moral 
rights claims against the publication of certain photographs without proper attribution.  Arguably, the court 
implicitly ranged issues of transmission of economic rights as matters falling within the scope of the law of 
the contract, and issues of moral rights as either coming within the substantive copyright law of the country 
of exploitation (France) or as covered by French mandatory rules overriding the otherwise applicable law, 
with respects to exploitations in France. 
57
Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters], May 28, 1991, IIC 1992, 702 (English 
translation).  See also Jane C. Ginsburg & Pierre Sirinelli, Authors and Exploitations in International 
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copyright and further assigned any economic and moral rights they might have had for 
other countries.  The Court of cassation disregarded the law of the contract and directly 
applied the French law prohibition on assignment of moral rights.  Significantly, the 
Court of cassation addressed only the French broadcast; the court did not rule that French 
law overrode the assignment with respect to the other territories for which the authors had 
granted rights.  It appears, therefore, that the inalienability of moral rights is a “loi de 
police,” or overriding mandatory rule requiring territorial application of the national norm 




Neither Bragance nor Huston squarely address the question of the application of 
French law norms to contracts governed by foreign law when the French norms concern 
the scope of the grant of economic rights (other than the statutory option in international 
contracts to elect a flat payment form of remuneration).  Nor do they distinguish between 
French-resident authors’ and non French-resident authors’ entitlement to the protection of 
those norms in France when a foreign law governs the contract.  Similarly, neither do 
these authorities consider different applicable law outcomes, when French law does 
govern the contract, between exploitations in or outside of France.  In general, most 
French authorities, including most scholars, assume or affirm that the foreign law 
designated in an international contract will govern the scope of the grant and the modes 
of its transfer unless the French courts deem the local norm to express a domestic public 
policy so significant that the local norm should displace the otherwise applicable foreign 
law.
59
  It also appears that French authorities do not consider domestic rules dictating the 
form of the contract (for example, the requirement that the grant be in writing or manifest 
a particular level of specificity) to be overriding mandatory rules or to meet the standards 
of ordre public international;
60
 as a result, a contract governed by foreign law need not 




Several aspects of the 2014 amendments nonetheless suggest that the law 
implements public policies that the French legislator would not have wished the parties to 
evade by submitting the contract to a foreign law.  As an initial matter, foreign contract 
law cannot displace substantive French copyright rules; one might therefore endeavor to 
ascertain which aspects of the 2014 law are substantive copyright rules, and which fall 
within the domain of contract law, for only the latter features are at risk of avoidance 
through application of a foreign contract law.  As suggested earlier, however, separating 
substantive from contractual obligations is a difficult and uncertain exercise, and one we 
will not undertake here.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Private Law: The French Supreme Court and the Huston Film Colorization Controversy, 15 COLUM.-VLA 
J. LAW & THE ARTS 135 (1991). 
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See, e.g., Ginsburg & Sirinelli, supra note 57. 
59
See, e.g., Tristan Azzi, Les contrats d’exploitation des droits de propriété littéraire et artistique en DIP: 
Etat des questions 214 RIDA 3, 53 (Oct 2007); Conseil Supérieur de la propriété littéraire et artistique, 
Rapport de la commission spécialisée portant sur la loi applicable en matière de propriété littéraire et 
artistique p. 11 (2003).  Cf. Rome I art 12(1)(a); CLIP 3:506(1)(a) (law of contract covers interpretation). 
60
See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 56, at 394, nn. 70-71. 
61
Unless these are characterized as matters of substantive copyright law, see discussion infra. 
15 
 
Even as to features of the 2014 law properly classified as contractual, most of the 
dispositions are mandatory as a matter of domestic law; that is, the parties may not 
contract out of the new obligations.  Moreover, in its search to ensure that authors receive 
“just and equitable” remuneration for digital exploitations, the 2014 law details a variety 
of means to that end, particularly where the traditional economic model of royalties based 
on sales of copies of books no longer represents the online economic model.  The 
legislature further expressed its strong intent to ensure effective author protections by 
extending the 2014 law’s application to contracts concluded before the new law’s entry 
into force. 
 
While the French law does not specify its territorial application, it is reasonable to 
infer a legislative intent to retain control over some extraterritorial effects of the contract.  
For example, foreign exploitations undertaken by the original French publisher, such as 
making available ebook downloads or online consultations of text to customers located 
outside of France, would remain within the ambit of the 2014 amendments in light of 
their close connection to France.  Indeed, given the 2014 law’s focus on digital 
exploitations, it would be self-defeating were the parties able to invoke the inherently 
multinational nature of digital exploitations as the basis for avoiding the application of 
French law.  But the territorial ambitions of the 2014 reforms are not so bold as to reach 
all extraterritorial transactions, as the following scenario demonstrates.  Suppose the 
publishing contract granted worldwide rights to a French publisher.  The publisher then 
grants foreign publishers exploitation rights for their separate territories.  These contracts 
provide for a single payment from each foreign publisher.  The French publisher may 
have a duty to account to the French author for these transactions, but even were the 
subgrants to foreign publishers governed by French law, the author would have no claims 
against the foreign publishers because the author is not a party to those contracts.  
 
The best interpretation of the international application of the 2014 French reforms 
(to the extent they are characterized as contractual rather than substantive) would deem 
them rules of mandatory application (lois de police) to exploitations of works taking 
place in (or in the case of digital exploitations, originating from) France.  Even without 
the explicit provision found in the new Dutch law, it is possible to infer from the law’s 
detailed and unwaivable obligations a legislative intent to preserve the benefits of the 









Our analysis of the Dutch and French laws shows that some ambiguity remains whether 
the author-protective provisions of these laws will in fact entitle authors (whether or not 
resident in those states) to the benefits of the legislature’s recalibration of the power 
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relationship between creators and exploiters, at least for exploitations in those states, 
when the contract covers multiple territories and designates a different national law.  We 




As a starting point, one might observe that where domestic law does not permit 
the parties to contract out of local author protections, it seems problematic to achieve the 
prohibited objective by selecting as the contract’s governing law a national law that either 
lacks those protections or allows the parties to contract out of them.  Because many 
publishers may demand multiterritorial rights either to exploit themselves, for example, 
over the Internet, or to be exercised by foreign branches of the same publisher, or to grant 
to foreign publishers, it is likely that most publishing contracts will cover more than one 
country.  Moreover, given its international character, the contract may well choose a law 
other than that of the author’s residence.  If all that is needed to elude local author 
protections is to select a different country’s law to govern the contract, then only purely 
local (and accordingly, probably small) publishers will have to abide by local author-
protective rules.  That the biggest economic actors prove the least subject to the 
obligations of the author’s local law, while the smallest actors bear most of the burden of 
compliance, also seems undesirable. 
 
The strongest argument in favor of allowing the law that is chosen to govern the 
contract to cover all issues of scope, interpretation, and form of the grant emphasizes the 
simplification of multinational copyright exploitation.  If the work has multiple authors, 
all from different countries, and/or the publisher (or other intermediary exploiter) 
anticipates exploiting the work in multiple territories, each of whose author-protective 
measures applied, the publisher’s actual acquisition of rights may depend on compliance 
with multiple local and possibly inconsistent obligations, or may be curtailed by local 
limitations on the scope of the grant.  In theory, it is advantageous to the parties to the 
contract (or to the stronger party to the contract, most likely the exploiter rather than the 
author) to select a single law to govern the extent of the transfer of rights and the means 
by which the transfer is effectuated.  Thus, local law obligations to state the nature and 
scope of the rights with specificity, or to provide additional remuneration for the transfer 
of certain kinds of rights, or to provide proportional remuneration, or to exercise the 
rights granted within a certain period, all yield to the law of the contract’s resolution of 
those issues.  The resulting simplification promotes the efficient multinational 
exploitation of works of authorship. 
 
On closer reflection, however, privileging the law of the contract may not in fact 
significantly reduce complexity.  First, objections to the application of multiple national 
laws are overstated.  Even if the law of the contract governs issues that fall within the 
domain of contract law, that law does not trump substantive national copyright norms.  
For example, it is clear that an author cannot grant rights that do not exist in the territories 
for which the rights are granted, even if the rights exist under the law chosen to govern 
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We acknowledge that the most direct and consistent way to protect authors as the weaker parties to 
contracts for the exploitation of their works would be through international harmonization of the 
substantive rules of authors’ contracts.  Since a multilateral instrument seems unlikely in the near-term, a 
second-best approach is to harmonize the conflict of law rules. 
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the contract; the contract cannot effectively create new rights in those countries.
64
  By the 
same token, if the duration of copyright in the country whose law governs the contract is 
longer than the duration of copyright in some of the countries for which rights are 
granted, the contract cannot effectively extend the copyright term for those countries.  
 
Thus, to the extent that the matter concerns substantive rights under copyright, the 
exploiter will have to take into account many local incursions into the transaction, 
whatever the law that governs the contract.  Admittedly, construing the domains of 
contract law and copyright law to allocate most issues of scope to the former will help 
simplify the transaction by submitting those issues to the single law of the contract.  
Uncertainty may nonetheless persist so long as characterization of the issue as one of 
contract or of copyright remains a matter for the law of the forum, although a forum 
selection clause may direct litigation to a forum whose characterizations favor the party 
urging the application of exploiter-friendly contract rules.
65
    
    
Second, the prospect that local mandatory rules may override the chosen contract 
law both reintroduces complexity and adds further uncertainty to the mix.  The 
simplification that results from vesting the law of the contract with competence to 
determine issues of scope and means is therefore misleading, because one cannot always 
anticipate when local authorities will deem the author-protective rule to be of overriding 
mandatory application in a given territory.  Parties planning an international exploitation 
of the work therefore cannot count on the application of the law of the contract and thus 
ignore the provisions of local laws regulating authors’ contracts.  Rather, they will need 
to take these into account in order to assess the likelihood that in a given jurisdiction the 
copyright law or local authorities will privilege the local norm over the contractual norm.  
Thus, business planning remains complex, with the added risks flowing from the 
unpredictability of the imposition of other national norms.  A forum-selection clause may 
diminish this risk as well, but may not eliminate it entirely;
66
 even if the forum would not 
find the author-oppressive law of the contract to violate the forum’s own mandatory 
rules, it might apply another country’s mandatory rules with respect to exploitations 
occurring in that territory.
67
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See, e.g., ALI Principles of Intellectual Property § 301 (2008); CLIP art. 3:102 (2011) (law of country for which 
protection is sought governs existence of rights in that country). 
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Of course, ensuring both favorable characterization rules and favorable contract rules may require 
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See Rome I art. 9.3 (“Effect may be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the 
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consequences of their application or non-application.”).  The threshold of incompatibility between the 
chosen law and the “overriding mandatory provisions,” however, is very high; it does not suffice that the 
local provision cannot be derogated from by agreement.  See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, The Hague 




A truly simpler approach would treat issues of scope and mode (form as well as 
substance of contract) as part of the substantive right transferred, and therefore would 
subject all of them to local copyright law, rather than the chosen contract law.  Arguably, 
this approach leaves little room for party autonomy.  The observation may be true, but it 
also misses the point:  the purpose of author-protective laws is to override party 
“autonomy.”  On the other hand, national legislatures may be most solicitous of their own 
resident authors; they may be less concerned to tamper with the “freedom” of non-
resident authors to enter into leonine contracts with non resident exploiters.  An approach 
that classed all issues of scope and mode with substantive rights would entitle non 
resident as well as resident authors to local protections, even when the center of gravity 
of the contract might lie elsewhere.  Admittedly, a national legislature might well intend 
such a result; indeed that appears to be the case, for example, under the US Copyright 
Act’s termination right, which allows all authors of works protected in the US to 
terminate grants of U.S. rights (but not foreign rights), regardless of the law that governs 
the contract of transfer of rights.
68 
 Even where the legislature has trained on local 
authors, it still might intend for local protections to apply to all, lest foreign authors 





Characterization, however, is a two-edged sword:  classing all questions of scope 
and mode as going to the substance of the copyright law would limit the effect of author-
protective legislation to the territory of that country, so that the scope of a contract 
between parties both resident in that country but granting foreign as well as domestic 
rights would depend on the law of each country of exploitation.  For example, a French 
publisher would have no duty to account to the author for exploitations the publisher 
undertakes abroad if the copyright laws of the countries of exploitation impose no similar 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
L. 873, 882–889 (2013).  See also HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, HAGUE 
PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (Mar. 19, 2015): 
Article 11  
Overriding mandatory rules and public policy (ordre public) 
1. These Principles shall not prevent a court from applying overriding mandatory  
provisions of the law of the forum which apply irrespective of the 
law chosen by the parties. 
2. The law of the forum determines when a court may or must apply or take into account  
overriding mandatory provisions of another law 
See generally Symeonides, supra at 889: 
the [Hague] Principles adopt a fairly high threshold for the mandatory-rules exception, which, 
combined with the traditionally high threshold for the order-public exception, produces a very 
liberal party-autonomy regime. Such a regime is acceptable, indeed welcome, in international 
commercial contracts between parties with relatively equal bargaining power. However, in 
contracts such as those involving the afore-mentioned franchisees and other small business 
owners, this regime will worsen the existing inequalities by enabling the stronger parties to impose 
well-calculated combinations of choice-of-law-and-forum clauses that will deprive the weaker 
parties of any meaningful protection. This is a regrettable feature of the Principles. 
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17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(5).  See Corcovado Music Corp. V. Hollis Music, Inc., 981 F.2d 679, 682 (2nd Cir. 
1993). 
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This may be a rationale for the German copyright law’s extension of rights of fair compensation to 
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obligation.  Thus, even though the center of gravity of the author-publisher relationship 
may be France, under an approach that characterizes questions of scope and mode as 
going to the substantive copyright law, there is no center of gravity, merely a set of 
distinct countries of exploitation. 
 
If the principal shortcoming of a fully territorialist approach (expressed by a rule 
that characterizes all issues of scope and mode as coming within the domain of the 
substantive copyright law, rather than of the contract) is to render multinational 
exploitation, particularly over the Internet, excessively complex, then an alternative 
approach, one that relies on the connecting factor of the author’s residence, is simpler to 
apply (at least where the work is single-authored, or all co-authors reside in the same 
country), but manifests different troubling consequences.  Suppose the rule designated 
the copyright-contract law of the author’s residence to govern the scope of the grant for 
all countries.
70
  For example, the rule might state: 
 
The law chosen by the parties to a contract of transfer of rights under copyright or 
neighboring rights shall not have the result of depriving an author or performer of 
the protection afforded to him or her by the provisions that cannot be derogated 
from by agreement under the law of his or her State of habitual residence at the 




If the law of the State of habitual residence at the time of conclusion of the contract 
includes mandatory provisions whose application is not expressly limited to the territory 
of that State, their prohibition on contracting out of the pertinent protections would apply 
not only to exploitations in the State of habitual residence, but also to all other territories 
covered by the contract.
72
  Suppose, for example, a U.K. law contract between a French 
author and a British publisher transferring worldwide print and digital rights.  French law 
requires separate specification of the print and digital grants, on pain of nullity of the 
contract;
73
 U.K. law imposes no similar requirement.
74
  If the protections of the author’s 
home State apply to the full territorial scope of her grant, then the transaction will be void 
even with respect to States lacking those protections and even if the principal exploitation 
of the work occurs outside her home State.  As discussed in connection with the new 
Dutch measures, it is not clear why one State’s author should enjoy her home State’s 
protections in other States.  At least, the author should not enjoy these protections when 
her publisher resides in a different State.  Where author and publisher share a residence, 
one might imagine that the State of common residence could seek to regulate the grant of 
rights for the full territorial extent of their dealings.  But local publishers might elude that 
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As noted in Part II.A.1, the new Dutch law may lead to this outcome, if the author is deemed the debtor of 
the “characteristic performance” and the contract is localized on that basis at the author’s residence. 
71
Thanks to Marie-Elodie Ancel and to Edouard Treppoz for this formulation.  
72
Compare Dutch Copyright Contract Act art. 25h(2)(a) (if the contract is localized in the Netherlands, 
Dutch author-protective rules apply, without apparent distinction as to whether contract covers other 
territories as well), with art. 25h(2)(b) (contract provides exclusively or predominantly for exploitation in 
NL). 
73
French Code of Intellectual Property art. L132-17-1. 
74
See, e.g., Cour d’Appel Paris, 2 Apr. 2003, Martinelli v. Gallimard, 198 RIDA 413, 9 PROPRIÉTÉS 
INTELLECTUELLES 392 (Oct. 2003) obs. A. Lucas. 
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objective, notably by subcontracting foreign rights to foreign publishers.  Unless the law 
of the State of common residence imposes its author-protective obligations on the 
publisher’s successors in title,
75
 the first publisher’s foreign grantee will incur none of 
those duties under a contract governed by the law of the grantee’s State (assuming that 
State does not impose similar obligations for the benefit of authors not party to the 
contract between publishers).   
 
 Local mandatory rules that specify their territorial application afford one private 
international law technique to ensure that authors preserve the protections of their 
countries of residence whatever the law otherwise applicable to a grant of national or 
international rights.  We have seen that the Dutch law takes a step in this direction, but 
may not go far enough in defining the international situations to which the Dutch law will 
apply.  The following text offers another attempt: 
 
(1) Whatever the law applicable to the contract, all States may require that their 
courts apply national laws that protect the rights of authors and that cannot be 
derogated from by agreement.
76
   
In that event, States should define the criteria of territorial application of such 
provisions.  The State may take into account and determine what weight to 
accord, notably: 
- the localization within its territory of the habitual residence of the author 
or of his/her co-contractant, or of both, at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract; 
- the exclusive or predominant exploitation of the work within the territory 
of the State.  
(2) The courts of one State may give effect to similar mandatory provisions of 
another State when that State would apply its law to a grant that presents a close 
connection to that State.  
In order to determine whether to give effect to foreign mandatory rules regarding 
authors’ contracts, national courts should take into account the consequences of 




This approach gives national legislatures the possibility to direct courts to apply their 
own, or other States’, author-protective laws regardless of the law that otherwise applies 
to the contract.  Under this text, the author’s habitual residence is one consideration, but it 
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As the Dutch law does with respect to the obligation to exploit the work, though it is not clear that this 
provision was intended to bind foreign successors in title. Dutch Copyright Contract Act art. 25e(6) 
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irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation”).  The proposed rule is 
less stringent than Rome I, which states in Recital 37 that “The concept of ‘overriding mandatory 
provisions’ should be distinguished from the expression ‘provisions which cannot be derogated from by 
agreement’ and should be construed more restrictively.” 
77
Thanks to Marie-Elodie Ancel for this formulation.  Cf. the more restrictive standard of Rome I art. 9.3.  
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is neither determinative (where the forum coincides with the author’s residence) nor 
preclusive (when the author resides in another state).  Legislatures can give national 
courts more or less discretion as to the application of the point (1) criteria.  This approach 
builds in considerable flexibility, but presents the concomitant disadvantage of 
complexity, since it would appear that each country’s mandatory rules would apply only 
with respect to exploitations occurring within that country’s borders.  Moreover, 
complexity augments if various States differently identify or weight the criteria or confer 
varying levels of discretion on their courts.  Finally, the rules risk “deactivation”
78
 by 
forum-selection clauses designating courts of States that do not apply other States’ 
mandatory rules. 
 
 Another approach offers more simplicity, and may more successfully resolve 
problems of extraterritoriality: 
 
Limitations to the scope of the law applicable to the contract or its formal validity: 
 
(1) (a) Regardless of the law applicable to a contract dealing with intellectual 
property rights, a creator or a performer can invoke the protection afforded to him 
by the provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement under the law of 
the State where, under the contract, the exclusive or predominant exploitation of 
the rights is due to take place. 
(b) Where the place of exclusive or predominant exploitation of the rights cannot 
be determined pursuant to letter (a), a creator or a performer can invoke the 
protection afforded to him by the provisions that cannot be derogated from by 
agreement under the law of the State of his habitual residence at the time of 
conclusion of the contract.  
 
Similarly, where several creators or performers habitually resident in different 
States contract with another party, they can specify in the contract which law, 
among the States of their habitual residence, will govern their inalienable rights; 
otherwise, they can invoke the protection afforded to them by the provisions that 
cannot derogated from by agreement by the law of the State with which all of 




This solution ranks the law of the country of predominant exploitation above the law of 
the author(s)’ country of residence; whichever country’s author-protective rules apply, 
they will control the full territorial extent of the transaction.  In the former case, the 
transaction’s center of gravity will be the country of exclusive or predominant 
exploitation; the simplification gained by applying that country’s rules to exploitations 
occurring other States may well warrant extraterritorial spillover.  But that conclusion 
may turn on the understanding of “predominant”: as we have seen in connection with the 
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 the term does not define what proportion of the exploitations must take 
place in the norm-imposing country.  The greater the spillover, the more controversial the 
extraterritorial extension. 
 
 The alternative choice of law also depends on the meaning of “predominant,” for 
the author-protective rules of the author(s)’ residence will apply only in the absence of an 
exclusive or predominant place of exploitation.  The alternative rule helpfully confronts 
the potential complexity of a residence criterion when a multiplicity of differently-
residing authors or performers effects the transfer, by proposing rules to identify a single 
country for all co-authors.  It also reduces complexity by providing for the application of 
the author-protective provisions of the (designated) country of residence to the whole 
transaction.  We have seen that extraterritorial application of the residence criterion may 
result in applying a law that does not converge with the transaction’s center of gravity, 
but this approach avoids that critique because the residence criterion comes into play only 
in the absence of a contractual center of gravity.  Nonetheless, the extraterritorial 
application of the law of the author’s residence, particularly if that law includes 
obligations whose non fulfillment voids the contract, may seem exorbitant. 
 
A final example would guarantee authors and performers the benefits of their 
home States’ protective legislation, but would limit the application of those provisions to 
the territory of the author’s or performer’s habitual residence.  
 
Notwithstanding the law applicable to a contract of transfer of rights under 
copyright, a creator may invoke the right of the country where she habitually 
resided at the time of the work’s creation, for rights that cannot be 
waived/transferred under the law of that country, but only for the rights under 
copyright exploited in that territory.  
 
Notwithstanding the law applicable to a contract of transfer of neighboring rights, 
a performer may invoke the right of the country where she habitually resided at 
the time of the rendering of the performance, for rights that cannot be 
waived/transferred under the law of that country, but only for the rights under 




More rigid, but also more simple, this provision may offer the easiest rule to adopt.  (As 
discussed earlier, the rule does not preclude a national legislature from making its author 
protections available to non resident authors by characterizing particular author-
protective rules as substantive copyright rules, and therefore as subject to the law of the 
country for which protection is sought.)  For countries other than the author’s residence, 
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Like other mandatory rules, the rules offered here depart from classic, content-
neutral, private international law rules, because they seek to impose a particular outcome.  
But content-neutral choice of law rules are what create the problem that provoked this 
examination in the first place:  the rule of “party autonomy,” which directs courts to look 
to the law the parties choose for their contract, enables the stronger party to avoid weaker 
party protections simply by submitting the contract to a less-constraining national law.  In 
other words, when there is an imbalance in the power of the co-contractants, the rule of 
party autonomy is “neutral” only in appearance.  In fact, it favors the stronger party.
82
  
Accordingly, the Rome I Regulation recognizes that where the parties’ bargaining power 
is unequal, neutral rules should yield to weaker party-protective rules.  Recital 23 states:  
“As regards contracts concluded with parties regarded as being weaker, those parties 
should be protected by conflict of law rules that are more favourable to their interests 




In other words, corrective choice of law rules have already assaulted the edifice of 
private international law;
84
 there is no call to apologize for departures from the 
supposedly “neutral” default.
85
  The rules proposed here, moreover, remain within the 
general private international law (non substantive) framework
86
 because they in no way 
instruct States to adopt author-protective measures.  They simply endeavor to ensure, if a 
State does determine to recalibrate the balance of power between authors and exploiters, 
that the contract is not set to naught the State’s efforts to protect its resident authors or to 
regulate transactions primarily focused on that State. 
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